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Abstract—In this paper, we present the results of using bags
of system calls for learning the behavior of Linux containers
for use in anomaly-detection based intrusion detection system.
By using system calls of the containers monitored from the host
kernel for anomaly detection, the system does not require any
prior knowledge of the container nature, neither does it require
altering the container or the host kernel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linux containers are computing environments apportioned
and managed by a host kernel. Each container typically runs a
single application that is isolated from the rest of the operating
system. A Linux container provides a runtime environment for
applications and individual collections of binaries and required
libraries. Namespaces are used to assign customized views, or
permissions, applicable to its needed resource environment.
Linux containers typically communicate with the host kernel
via system calls.
By monitoring the system calls between the container and
the host kernel, one can learn the behavior of the container in
order to detect any change of behavior, which may reflect an
intrusion attempt against the container.
One of the basic approaches to anomaly detection using
system calls is the Bag of System Calls (BoSC) technique.
The BoSC technique is a frequency-based anomaly detection
technique, that was first introduced by Kang et al. in 2005 [1].
Kang et al. define the bag of system call as an ordered list
< c1, c2, . . . , cn >, where n is the total number of distinct
system calls, and ci is the number of occurrences of the system
call, si, in the given input sequence. BoSC has been used for
anomaly detection at the process level [1] and at the level of
virtual machines (VMs) [2][3][4], and has shown promising
results.
The fewer number of processes in a container, as compared
to VM, results in reduced complexity. The reduced complexity
gives the potential for the BoSC technique to have high detec-
tion accuracy with a marginal impact on system performance
when applied to anomaly detection in containers.
In this paper, we study the feasibility of applying the BoSC
to passively detect attacks against containers. The technique
used is similar to the one introduced by [3]. We show
that a frequency-based technique is sufficient for detecting
abnormality in container behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the system. Section III describes the
experimental design. Section IV discusses the results of the
experiments. Section V gives a brief summary of related work.
Section VI concludes with summary and future work.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this paper, we use a technique similar to the one described
in [3] applied to Linux containers for intrusion detection. The
technique combines the sliding window technique [5] with the
bag of system calls technique [1] as described below.
The system employs a background service running on the
host kernel to monitor system calls between any Docker
containers and the host Kernel. Upon start of a container,
the service uses the Linux strace tool to trace all system
calls issued by the container to the host kernel. The strace
command reports system calls with their originating process
ID, arguments, and return values. A table of all distinct system
calls in the trace is also reported at the end of the trace along
with the total number of occurrences.
The full trace, and the count table, are stored into a log
file that is processed offline and used to learn the container
behavior after the container terminates. At this point, we are
not performing any real-time behavior learning or anomaly
detection. Therefore, dealing with the whole trace of the con-
tainer offline is sufficient for our proof-of-concept purposes.
However, for future purposes, where behavior learning and
anomaly detection is to be achieved in real time (in which case
the full trace would not be available), the learning algorithm
applied would slightly differ from the one described here.
However, the same underlying concepts will continue to apply.
The generated log file is then processed to create two
files, namely syscall-list file and trace file. The syscall-list file
holds a list of distinct system calls sorted by the number of
occurrences. The trace file holds the full list of system calls
as collected by strace after trimming off arguments, return
values, and process IDs. The count file is used to create an
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syscall-index lookup table. The trace file is used to train the
classifier, as described below.
The system reads the trace file epoch by epoch. For each
epoch, a sliding window of size 10 is moved over the system
calls of the current epoch, counting the number of occurrences
of each distinct system call in the current window, and
producing a bag of system calls. As mentioned earlier, a bag
of system calls is an array < c1, c2, . . . , cns > where ci is
the number of occurrences of system call, si, in the current
window, and ns is the total number of distinct system calls.
When a new occurrence of a system call is encountered,
the application retrieves the index of the system call from
the syscall-index lookup table, and updates the corresponding
index of the BoSC. For a window size of 10, the sum of all
entries of the array equals 10, i.e.
∑ns
i=1 ci = 10. A sample
BoSC is shown below for ns = 20 and sequence size of 10.
[0,1,0,2,0,0,0,0,1,0,4,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1]
If the current BoSC already exists in the normal-behavior
database, its frequency is incremented by 1. Otherwise, the
new BoSC is added to the database with initial frequency of
1. The training is complete when all expected normal behavior
patterns are applied to the system.
To detect whether an input trace is anomalous, the trace is
read in epochs, and for each epoch, a sliding window is used to
check if the current BoSC is present in the database of normal
behavior database. If a BoSC is not present in the database,
a mismatch is declared. The trace is declared anomalous if
the number of mismatches within one epoch exceeds a certain
threshold.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Environment setup
For our experiments, we are using a Docker container
running on a Ubuntu Server 14.04 host operating system. The
docker image we used for creating the container is the official
mysql Docker image, which is basically a Docker image with
MySQL 5.6 installed on a Debian operating system.
On container start, the container automatically creates a
default database, adds users defined by the environment vari-
ables passed to the container, and then starts listening for
connections. Docker maps the MySQL port from the container
to some custom port on the host.
Since there is no dataset available that contains system
calls collected from containers, we needed to create our own
datasets for both normal and anomalous behavior. For that, we
created a container from the mysql Docker image. A normal-
behavior work load was initially applied to the container,
before it got “attacked” using a penetration testing tool.
B. Generating normal dataset
For generating normal-behavior dataset, we used
mysqlslap [6]; a program that emulates client load
for a MySQL server. The tool has command-line options that
allow the user to select the level of concurrency, and the
number of iterations to run the load test. In addition, it gives
the user the option to customize the created database, e.g.
by specifying the number of varcher and/or int columns
to use when creating the database. Moreover, the user can
select the number of insertions and queries to perform on the
database. The tool runs on the host kernel, and communicates
with the MySQL server running on the container.
C. Simulating malicious attack
To simulate an attack on the container, we used
sqlmap [7]; an automatic SQL injection tool normally used
for penetration testing purposes. In our experiment, we are
using it to generate malicious-behavior dataset by attacking
the MySQL database created on the container. Similarly, the
sqlmap tool runs on the host kernel, and communicates with
the attacked database through the Docker proxy.
D. Collecting and pre-processing data
A background service, running on the host kernel, automat-
ically detects any newly started Docker container, and traces
system calls of the new container using the Linux strace
tool.
The service relies on the Docker command events to
signal the service whenever a new container is started on the
host kernel. Upon detection of the new container, the service
starts to trace all processes running, on container start, within
the control group (cgroup) of the container. The service also
traces any forked child processes by using the -F option of
the strace tool.
The behavior file is then passed to an extraction tool to
split the output into two files, namely the count file and the
trace file. The count file holds a list of distinct system calls
sorted based on number of occurrences during the trace, while
the trace file holds the full list of system calls as collected by
strace after removing arguments, return values, and process
number information.
E. Modeling normal behavior
We have implemented a Java application to learn the normal
behavior of the container, i.e. train the classifier, using the
detection technique described in section II.
The application starts by building a syscall-index hash map
from the count file. The hash map stores distinct system calls
as the key, and a corresponding index as the value. A system
call that appears in the whole trace less than the total number
of distinct system calls is stored in the map as “other”. Using
“other” for relatively rarely-used system calls saves space,
memory, and computation time, as described in [3].
The application then reads the trace file in epochs. Each
epoch updates the normal-behavior database. The normal-
behavior database is another hash map with the BoSC as the
key and the frequency of the bag as the value. If the current
bag already exists in the database, the frequency value is
incremented. Otherwise, a new entry is added to the database.
For each epoch, the application uses the sliding window
technique to read sequences of system calls from the trace
file, with each sequence is of size 10. A bag of system calls
is then created by counting the frequency of each distinct
system call within the current window. The created bag of
system calls is a frequency array of size ns, where ns is the
number of distinct system calls. When a new occurrence of a
system call is encountered, the application retrieves the index
of the system call from the syscall-index hash map, and the
corresponding index of the frequency array is updated. The
new BoSC is then added to the normal-behavior database.
After running each epoch k, where k > 1, the database
is compared to a snapshot of the database before the epoch,
and an array of BoSC frequency changes, Ck, is calculated.
The cosine similarity metric is then used to find the similarity
between Ck and Ck−1 as shown in the equation below. Two
vectors are identical if cos (θ) is equal to 1.
cos (θk) =
Ck · Ck−1
‖Ck‖‖Ck−1‖
=
∑nk
i=1 Ck[i]Ck−1[i]√∑nk
i=1 Ck[i]
2
√∑nk−1
i=1 Ck−1[i]2
where Ck[i] is the ith entry of the Ck array, and nk is the
total number of database entries after epoch k.
The stopping condition for the training process is that the
similarity metric is greater than or equal to certain threshold,
Tt, for two consecutive epochs.
F. Detecting anomaly
The generated normal-behavior database is then applied to
the post-attack trace of the container for anomaly detection.
For each epoch, the sliding window technique is similarly used
to check if the current BoSC is present in the database of
normal behavior. A mismatch is declared whenever a BoSC
is not present in the database. If the number of mismatches
exceeds a certain threshold, Td, within one epoch, an anomaly
signal is raised.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Parameter Selection
A number of parameters were intuitively selected when
implementing our system. A list of this parameters is given
below:
• “Other” Threshold (To): The number of occurrences of a
system call in a trace in order to be marked as “other”.
This parameter is currently set to the total number of
distinct system calls, i.e. the size of the syscall-index map.
• Epoch Size (S): The total number of system calls in one
epoch. It was noticed that the ratio between the epoch
size and size of the input trace highly affects when and
whether the training succeeds.
• Sequence Size: A sequence size of 6 or 10 is usually
recommended when using sliding-window techniques for
better performance [5][8][9]. Here, we are using 10 since
it was already shown for a similar work that size 10
gives better performance than size 6 without dramatically
affecting the efficiency of the algorithm [3].
• Training Threshold (Tt): The cosine-similarity value
above which we declare two frequency-shift vectors as
similar, currently 0.99 (selected by experiment).
• Detection Threshold (Td): The number of detected mis-
matches before raising an anomaly signal, currently set
to 10% of the epoch size.
Investigating the correlation between the values of the
above parameters and the detection speed and accuracy, and
formulating a way for selecting their optimal values, is left as
future work.
B. Classifier evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the classifier, we are using
the true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR)
metrics, defined as follows:
TPR = Ntp/Nmalicious (1)
FPR = Nfp/Nnormal (2)
where Nnormal and Nmalicious are the total number of normal
and malicious sequences, respectively, and Ntp and Nfp are
the number of true positives and false positives, respectively.
C. Results
We applied the described technique to a trace of 5, 285, 211
system calls, using an epoch size (S) of 5000. The trainer
completed training after 37 epochs. The number of distinct
system calls (ns) was 42, and the size of the normal behavior
database was 10809 entries.
The malicious data created a strong anomaly signal with an
average of 2862 mismatches per epoch, while the normal data
had an average of 16 mismatches per epoch. For Tt = 0.99
and Td = 0.1S, the true positive rate is 100% and the false
positive rate is 0.58%.
Figure 1 shows the tradeoff between learning speed and
accuracy. For instance, setting the training threshold (Tt) to
0.9935 drops the FPR to 0% at the expense of raising the
number of epochs needed for training to 172 epochs.
For Tt = 0.99 and Td = 0.1S, we needed a total of
185, 000 system calls to train the classifier. Applying the
technique to VMs, the training process needed 5 epochs, each
of 11, 743, 281 system calls, to complete [3]. Hence, it can be
seen that the reduced complexity of the container resulted in
a more efficient intrusion detection system as anticipated.
V. RELATED WORK
Alarifi and Wolthusen used system calls for implementing a
host-based intrusion detection for virtual machines residing in
a multi-tenancy Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment.
They dealt with the VM as a single process, despite the
numerous processes running inside it, and monitored system
calls between the VM and the host operating system [3] [4].
In [3], they used the BoSC technique in combination with
the sliding window technique for anomaly detection. In their
technique, they read the input trace epoch by epoch. For
(a) Accuracy
(b) Training Time
Fig. 1. Effect of changing Tt on accuracy and training time
each epoch, a sliding window of size k moves over the
system calls of each epoch, adding bags of system calls to the
normal behavior database. The normal behavior database holds
frequencies of bags of system calls. After building the normal-
behavior database, i.e. training their classifier, an epoch is
declared anomalous if the change in BoSC frequencies during
that epoch exceeds certain threshold. For a sliding window
of size 10, their technique gave 100% accuracy, with 100%
detection rate, and 0% false positive rate.
In [4], Alarifi and Wolthusen applied HMM for learning
sequences of system calls for short-lived virtual machines.
They based their decision on the conclusion from [8] that
“HMM almost always provides a high detection rate and a
low minimum false positives but with high computational
demand”. Their HMM-based technique gave lower detection
rates, yet required lower number of training samples. By using
780, 000 system calls for training, the resulting detection rate
was 97%.
A number of intrusion detection systems used sequences
of system calls to train a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
classifier [8][10][11][12][13]. However, each system differs in
the technique used for raising anomaly signal. Wang et al. [10],
for example, raise anomaly signal when the probability of
the whole sequence is below certain threshold. Warrender et
al. [8], on the other hand, declares a sequence as anomalous
when the probability of one system call within a sequence
is below the threshold. Cho and Park [12] used HMM for
modeling normal root privilege operations only. Hoang et
al. [13] introduced a multi-layer detection technique that
combines both outcomes from applying the Sliding Window
approach and the HMM approach.
Warrender et. al compared STIDE [5], RIPPER [14], and
HMM-based methods in [8]. They concluded that all methods
performed adequately, while HMM gave the best accuracy on
average. However, it required higher computational resources
and storage space, since it makes multiple passes through the
training data, and stores significant amount of intermediate
data, which is computationally expensive, especially for large
traces.
The Kernel State Modeling (KSM) technique represents
traces of system calls as states of Kernel modules [15]. The
technique observes three critical states, namely Kernel (KL),
Memory Management (MM), and File System (FS) states. The
technique then detects anomaly by calculating the probability
of occurrences of the three observed states in each trace
of system calls, and comparing the calculated probabilities
against the probabilities of normal traces. Applied to Linux-
based programs of the UNM dataset, the KSM technique
shows higher detection rates and lower false positive rates,
compared to STIDE and HMM-based techniques.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown the results of applying
the BoSC technique for detecting anomaly in the behavior
of Linux containers. We were able to show that malicious
sequences created a strong anomaly signal, resulting in a 100%
detection rate, with low false positive rate of 0.58%.
We used the BoSC technique to train the classifier, and test
for anomalies in offline mode. Our next step is to modify the
algorithm to be more suitable for deployment in a real-time
intrusion detection system. In addition, some of the parameters
currently used by the system are selected at random. Future
work is to be directed to studying the effect of such parameters
on the learning process and the detection speed and accuracy,
in an attempt to formalize a way for optimizing their values
for the target application.
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